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THE ORGANIZATION FOR TUE ENFORCEMENT
OF THE CRIMINAL LAW IN FRANCE,
GERMANY AND ENGLAND
MoRRIs PLOSCOWE*

The administration of justice is a composite task. To deal with
any one offender the efforts of police, prosecutors and judges are
necessary. Europe may require in addition the intervention of an
investigating magistrate (juge d'instruction). The success of criminal law enforcement depends upon the proper functioning of each
one of these agents and upon their harmonious cooperation. Nor
is it only upon these agents and the procedures they apply that
satisfactory enforcement of the law depends. As an essential branch
of governmental activity, the enforcement of the criminal law
reflects the strength and weaknesses of the governmental structure.
The composite nature of the task, the interdependence of the agents,
the general dependence upon the government have been brought
home to us by the American surveys of criminal justice of the past
decade. The blame for the breakdown in law enforcemeit cannot
be laid at the door of police without taking into account the subsequent activities of prosecutors and courts. No matter how intelligent police work is, it can be and often has been nullified by corruption, incompetence, or indifference in the prosecuting office.
Ineffective prosecution of criminal cases, on the other hand, maybe less the fault of the prosecutor than of inefficient police work
or the uncooperative attitude of judges. Yet judges and juries
cannot be blamed for failure to convict in a sufficient number of
cases, or adequately to sentence offenders unless police and prosecutors have entirely fulfilled their duty in unearthing and presenting evidence in court. If enforcement is unsatisfactory, no assignment of responsibility is fair until it is ascertained whether the
fault lies with one or another group of officials or with political
interference. The party in power manipulating the machinery of
criminal justice for its own ends, or powerful persons using influence
for personal profit, do just as much damage in different directions.
In view of all these factors it is useful to begin a discussion of the
*
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prosecution of crime with a brief consideration of the principal
agents involved in the criminal process, their relations to each
other, and their place in the governmental framework.
Probably nowhere is the contrast between European and American qrininal justice so vivid and so unfavorable to America as in
the field of organization. It would be impossible for an European
observer of his own scene to comment as Dean Pound does on "the
way in which the different agencies of justice, acting quite independently, continually hinder or thwart each other, or, if fortunately
there is no interference, at best lend each other little or no aid.
Each state, each county, each municipality, each court, each prosecutor, each police organization-and often more than one is operating in the same territory-is likely to go its independent course,
with little or no regard for what the other is doing. It may even
happen that state and federal prosecuting agencies or judicial officers may cross each others paths and interfere with each others
operations.

.

.

.

Where there is but one jurisdiction involved,

police, public prosecutor and coroner may proceed with parallel
investigations, or with investigations that cross each other, or may
even hamper each other, as the exigencies of politics, quest for
publicity, or zeal for the public service may dictate."'
Such a situation is impossible in Europe, where the organization corresponds to the reality of the interdependence of the agencies of the criminal law. All the agents engaged in the common
task of the enforcement of the law are subject to one head, and
linked to him by clear lines of administrative supervision and responsibility which run from him through the highest judges and
prosecutors right down to the humblest policeman. If friction and
jealousy do arise as they are bound to among different groups of
officials, there is some means of controlling it. It is never allowed
to become so serious that it undermines the general enforcement
of the law.
The chief agency of integration is the Minister of Justice, a
member of the national executive. In France and Italy the Minister
of Justice is responsible for the functioning of the prosecuting authorities, the civil and criminal courts, and the execution of penalties.
Even in pre-Hitler Germany, where the administration of justice
was a function of the province rather than the Federal state, the
provincial administration was modeled upon the centralized organ-

ization of France and Italy, and culminated in the Minister of Jus'Criminal Justice mi America, 174-175, 176.
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tice. -With the Nazis has come complete centralization of authority.
The independence of the provinces has been eliminated. The administration of justice has become a national and not a provincial
function. The officials engaged in criminal justice administration
are now subject2 to the orders and supervision of the Reich's Minister of Justice.
Centralization of power in the Minister of Justice accords with
the canons of parliamentary government which make a cabinet
officer responsible to a popularly elected legislature for the functioning of every important branch of governmental activity. In
France this situation still holds. A Minister of Justice goes out of
office with the cabinet to which he belongs; if his policies are disapproved he may even be the cause of its downfall. The French
arrangement was the model for Germany and Italy, but with the
rise of dictators in both countries, the responsibility of the Minister
of Justice has shifted from the legislature to the Duce or the Filbrer.
The Minister of Justice in Europe is at one and the same time
the chief prosecuting officer of the State as well as the chief administrative officer of the courts. As the chief prosecuting officer he
is directly responsible for the conduct of prosecutions throughout
the country. All the prosecutors attached to the various courts are
subject to his orders. He appoints them to their posts. He has
complete powers of discipline over them. He may remove them at
will. The Minister of Justice also supervises the courts. But his
powers over the judges are restricted. Although he appoints and
promotes judges, they are to a certain extent independent of him
since they are irremovable during good behavior. If a judge is
remiss in his duties, in order to effect his removal the Minister of
Justice must bring him before a special disciplinary court.
It is to the officials in the central office of the Ministry that the
Minister of Justice must look for assistance in performing the
manifold duties of his office. In France, this central .office is divided
into three main divisions. The personnel division, has charge of
all matters relating to the choice and discipline. of the judicial and
prosecuting hierarchy. The division in charge of civil cases is concerned with all matters of judicial organization, the functioning of
the courts, and the discipline of ministerial officers and lawyers.
The division in charge of criminal cases has great importance for
criminal justice. It is intimately in touch with what the prosecutors
are doing. It is this division to which prosecutors refer cases when
2 See I Reichsgesetzblatt 1934, Ibid., 1935, 68, 403, 65.
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they are in doubt as to the proper course of action and from it they
receive instructions. 5 In organization and function the Ministers of
Justice in Italy and Germany are similar.
Thus it is that the Minister of Justice holds in his hands the
government of all judicial and prosecuting officers. The cardinal
virtue of this system is the power of administrative supervision
that it gives to the Minister. Through the various bureaus of the
Ministry, the Minister of Justice can keep in touch with what all
agents and agencies engaged in the enforcement of the law are
doing. Not only can he supervise their activities; he can also bring
them up to required standards of efficiency. His disciplinary powers
are ample enough to compel cooperation between various branches
of the administration or to remove inefficient or corrupt public servants. Being in close touch with the entire administration of justice, it is not very difficult for the Minister to uncover its weaknesses and take steps for their correction Reforms can be planned
with reference to the manner in which they affect the entire organization. In Italy, for example, a new code of criminal law and
a new code of criminal procedure as well as laws reforming the
judicial organization were all prepared under the direction of Minister of Justice Rocco, within a period of five years. In France the
committee of lawyers, professors and judges which is at present
drawing up a revision of the century old Code P6nal works under
the general direction and in close touch with the Minister of Justice.
The nearest approach in America to a European Ministry of
Justice is the Department of Justice in Washington, which controls
the activities of the various Federal District Attorneys throughout
the country and is in touch with the operation of the Federal courts.
It has a unit of its own for criminal investigation. Various police
agencies of other Federal departments can be made to cooperate
with it through their ultimate responsibility to the President, who
is also the chief of the Attorney General. But the Federal Government is engaged only in the enforcement of Federal laws, while
the real burden of briminal law administration falls upon the states.
Each state makes and enforces its own criminal law and is governed by its own code of criminal procedure. There is nothing in
state administration to correspond to the European Ministry of
Justice. Prosecutors are locally elected and are responsible only
to the citizens that have elected them. Police are responsible to
5For a description of the organization of the Ministry of Justice see H.
Chardon, L'Administration de la France, pp. 414-424.
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the chief executive in the various cities and towns. In many states
there is a small state police force, but their chief has no way of
compelling a prosecutor to cooperate with them, nor can a prosecutor necessarily insist and obtain their assistance. The attorney
general, the chief legal officer of the state, is also usually elected.
If he has the power to supervise and control the activities of the
local prosecuting offices, he is usually in no position to exercise it
because of the possible political consequences to him. The Governor, upon whom rests the duties of enforcing the law, can act
only through the independent agencies already enumerated. The
courts are also independent of any link with the other agencies.
Judges are for the most part locally elected and responsible only
to their electorate.
In Europe the Minister of Justice exercises his authority
through two separate though related hierarchies: the one of judges
and the other of prosecutors. They are both erected on the basis
of the organization of the courts, which embodies the simple and
practical principle that the more serious the offense the greater
must be the formal guarantee to the accused against unfair convic-t
tion. Each country has a three-fold classification of courts according to the gravity of the offenses with which they deal. In France
and Italy the inferior criminal courts are manned by a single judge
and have a limited jurisdiction. The French Police Courts (tribunaux de simple police) try only petty offenses; "contraventions,"
punishable by fines up to fifteen francs or imprisonment up to five
days.6 In Italy, the jurisdiction of the inferior courts (the pretori)
extends to cases in which imprisonment up to three years or fines
up to 10,000 lira may be inflicted. To keep cases of any seriousness
or complication out of these courts the Italian code provides that
the prosecuting attorney may bring a case ordinarily within the
7
competence of the pretori before a higher court.
s
In both countries the courts of general civil jurisdiction have
criminal branches which dispose of most of the offenses of medium
gravity. The competence of the French tribunal correctionnel
6 Art. 137, Code d'Instruction Criminelle, hereinafter referred to as C. I. C.
There are some exceptions to this general jurisdiction of the tribunaux de simple
police. Some special contraventions are tried in the tribunal correctionnel. On
the other hand, some special matters ordinarily within the jurisdiction of the
tribunal correctionnel are tried by the tribunal de simple police. See J. A. Roux,
Cours de Droit Criminel Francais, Vol. II, pp. 74-75.
7 Art. 31, Codice di procedura penale hereinafter referred to as C. P. P.
8 In France these courts are known as the tribunaux de premiere instance,
in Italy as the tribunale.
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extends to cases in which penalties up to five years may be imposed. In Italy the comparable courts, the tribunale, try cases in
which penalties up to eight years may be inflicted. In both countries these cases are heard by three judges and constitute the bulk
of the important criminal business." ° Special courts created as the
need arises try the most serious offenses in both France and Italy.
The French cour d'assises consists of three magistrates of superior
rank and a jury of twelve citizens to which issues of fact are submitted. The Italian corte d'assise, formerly a jury court, now consists of two magistrates of high rank and five laymen sitting together as one judicial tribunal."
Each country has a limited number of appellate courts which
hear appeals on matters of fact and law from the intermediate
courts.12 In a French cour d'appel every appeal was formerly
heard by five judges; a recent decree reduces the number of judges
necessary to three.'" An Italian corte di appello requires four
judges to decide appeals. The decision of the cour d'assises in
France and the corte d'assise in Italy on the facts are final; appeals
can be taken only on matters of law, and go to the supreme cofurt
of the land, the Cour de Cassation in Paris, the Corte di Cassazione
in Rome. Appeals on matters of law may also be taken to these
courts from decisions of the appellate courts.
In Germany, the law of 1924 placed the brunt of criminal jurisdiction upon the inferior court, the Amtsgericht. The Amtsrichter,
either alone 14 or with two laymen 5 (in which, cases the court is
9 Art. 40, Code P~nal and Art. 182, C. I. C.
lo In 1929 the tribunaux de simple police tried cases against 723,760 defendants.
The tribunal correctionnel tried cases against 246,690 defendants, the cour d'assises
tried cases against 1,704 defendants. Compte Gdn6ral de la Justice Criminelle,
1929, p. vi. In Italy, the pretori in 1930 tried cases against 637,435 defendants,
the tribunale tried 118,313 defendants and the corte d'assise tried 3,807 defendants.
Statistica Giudiziaria Penale 1929-1930, pp. XXXVII, XXXIX.
11 See Art. 2, Regio Decreto 23 marzo 1931, n. 249.
12 Appeals from the inferior courts go to the intermediate courts.
1s Decree of 25 June 1934, Les Lois Nouvelles, pp. 543, 545.
14The Amtsrichter has jurisdiction to try alone:
(1) in general all offenses
punishable by more than six months imprisonment; (2) offenses turned over to
him for trial by the Prosecuting Attorney where a prison penalty of no more
than one year is expected. But the Amtsrichter is not bound by this limit; (3)
cases of grand larceny, receiving stolen goods, and certain other offenses (Arts.
243, 244, 258, 260, 261, 264, Strafgesetzbuch). These cases may be turned over to
the Amtsrichter by the Prosecuting Attorney. But before the .Amtsrichter may
try them, the consent of the accused to such trial before a single judge must be
obtained. See Arts. 25, 26, Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz, hereinafter referred to as
G. V. G.
15 In general, the Schoffengericht has jurisdiction over offenses in which the
penalty may be up to ten years' imprisonment. See also 24, 28, G. V. G.
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known as the Schoffengericht) can now try most of the offenses in
the penal code. In specially serious or difficult cases, the prosecuting attorney may demand that a second judge be added to this
tribunal. 1 The most serious offenses are now triable by a court
(Schwurgericht) composed of three judges and six laymen sitting
together as one judicial tribunal, the traditional distinction between
fact and law having been destroyed, along with the old jury organization, as in Italy. 7 The old court of intermediate jurisdiction
(Strafkammer) which, prior to 1924 consisted of five judges, has
been completely transformed in character. It no longer has any
trial jurisdiction. It acts as an appellate court on matters of fact
and law from the decisions of the Amtsrichter and from the Schoffengericht. Instead of five judges, it now sits with one judge and
two laymen when trying appeals from decisions of the Amtsrichter
and three judges and two laymen when trying appeals from the
Schoffengericht. 8
The provincial appellate court in Germany
(Oberlandesgericht) which formerly decided appeals on matters of
fact and law, is now limited to appeals on matters of law alone from
decisions of the Strafkanmmer and the Amtsrichter. 19 Where a
violation of national law is alleged the appeal may usually be taken
to the Reichsgericht, 0 the supreme court of Germany.
In all three countries every court, whether it be inferior court
for petty cases, trial court of general jurisdiction or appeal court,
is part of one judicial organization which has as its ultimate chief
the Minister of Justice. The presiding judge of every court is its
administrative head to whom all officials connected with the court
are responsible. The presiding judges of inferior courts are in turn
responsible to the chief judge of the court next above theirs in rank.
The presiding judges of the intermediate courts are responsible for
the functioning of their own courts and for the other courts that
they supervise, to the chief judge of the appeal court in their jurisdiction. Thus the chief judge of every court of appeal is not alone
the responsible administrative head of his own court, but also the
chief supervisory officer of every inferior court within the jurisdicArt. 29(2) G. V. G.
Arts. 80, 81, 82, G. V. G.
18 Art. 76, G. V. G.
19Art. 121(1), G. V. G. In treason cases the Oberlandesgericht may be called
upon to act as a trial court. Arts. 134, 120, G. V. G.
20 This is true of appeals on matters of law from decisions of the Schwurgericht and the Strafkammer sitting as an appellate court from decisions of the
Schoffengericht. Art. 135, G. V. G. Likewise a defendant tried by a Schoffengericht of two judges and two laymen may take an appeal on law alone directly
to the Reichsgericht. See Gerland, Der Deutsche Strafprozess, p. 91.
16
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tion of his court. He, in turn, is the judicial officer most directly
in touch with the Minister of Justice. There is therefore possible
in every country a continued administrative supervision of the
courts exercised by various members of the judicial hierarchy. All
the courts of the country are knit together by the supervision
exercised from the Ministry of Justice.
This unified interrelated hierarchy of courts in Europe contrasts sharply with court organization in America. Independence
and lack of administrative unity characterize our system. Few
American courts of trial jurisdiction are fortunate enough to have
administrative superiors who direct, apportion and supervise the
work of the whole court. But even in such cases, as for example
the Chicago Municipal Court, the Detroit Recorder's Court, the
Cleveland Common Pleas Court, the influence of the supervisory
judge is persuasive. Individual judges can defy the authority of
the chief judge. They hold their posts by as good a title as that
of the chief judge, election by the people. Their ultimate responsibility is to their electorate. They cannot be compelled to recognize
the authority of an administrative superior. There is therefore
little internal unity in individual American courts. There is also
no administrative supervision in the European sense by the appellate .courts over the inferior courts or by a chief appellate judge
over the inferior court judges. In some cases judicial councils
exist which suggest better ways of performing judicial business or
which lay down rules of court or discuss matters relating to the
judicial organization generally. Whatever authorit these councils
exercise over individual judges is also persuasive in character. The
only legal tie between inferior and appellate courts is that the inferior courts must abide by the rules laid down by the higher
courts.
In France, the hierarchic organization of prosecution like the
judicial hierarchy parallels the courts and culminates in the Minister of Justice. Because of the complete dependence of the prosecutors upon the Minister of Justice it is possible to speak of the
prosecuting authorities as representatives of the executive authority attached to the courts. From highest to lowest, the prosecutors
are connected directly or through their superiors to the Minister
of Justice and are subject to his administrative supervision.
Attached to every court in France is a parquet, that is, a group
of prosecuting officials. The parquet of the Cour de Cassation consists of a chief prosecuting officer and six assistants, called avocats
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g~n6raux. The chief prosecutor is responsible directly to the Minister of Justice but does not exert any direct authority upon the
ordinary prosecution of criminal cases. He comes in touch with
criminal cases only when they come before the Cour de Cassation
on appeals on matters of law, when either he or one of his subordinates presents the case for the state.
The chief of the parquet of every cour d'appel is known as
the Procureur G~n6ral. He and his assistants (avocats g6n6raux
and substituts au Procureur G~n6ral) usually perform the functions of prosecuting attorneys in the cours d'appel and in the cours
d'assises which being temporary courts, have no permanent parquets of their own. The Procureurs G6n6raux of the 27 cours
d'appel are the chief medium by which the Minister of Justice
exercises his control over prosecutions. Every Procureur G6nral
is responsible to the Minister of Justice for the conduct of prosecutions in all the courts within the jurisdiction of his cour d'appel.
The Procureur G6n6ral must report periodically to.the Ministry of
Justice as to the action taken in prosecutions and the dispositions
of the criminal cases. Whenever an offense occurs which is of
special interest to the public order or one which may have political
repercussions, the Procureur G~n6ral must make a special report
to the Minister of Justice of the particulars of the offense and the
steps taken in its prosecution. Through the Procureur G6n6ral the
Minister of Justice transmits any orders he may have in confiection with criminal cases. Obedience to his orders are enforced by
his powers of disciplining or removing any subordinate.
The Procureur G~n6ral is in turn the immediate administrative
superior of the Procureurs de la l{6publique, the chiefs of the
parquets attached to the courts of first instance (tribunaux correctionnels) within his jurisdiction. The Procureur de la R6publique must make periodic reports to the Procureur G~nral on all
cases considered in his office and the action taken thereon. He is
also required to report specially on any case in which the Procureur
G6n6ral is interested. Any orders that are given to the Procureur
de la R6publique by the Procureur G6n6ral with respect to criminal
cases must be obeyed by the former official. The Procureur G~n6ral
also has a disciplinary power over his subordinates.2 1
The parquet of the police court, the French petty court, is
rudimentary in character. Its functions are performed usually by
21Faustin-Helie, Trait6 d'Instruction Criminelle, Vol. I, pp. 575-578; F.
Goyet, Le Ministkre Public, pp. 1, et seq; for the administrative organization of
prosecution see Garraud, Trait6 d'Instrtiction Crinilnelle, Vol. I, p. 17, et seq.
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a police official (Commissaire de police) in the town in which the
court is located. 22 Insofar as he functions as a prosecutor in the
petty offenses which come before the tribunal de simple police, he
is subject to the supervision of the Procureur de la Rdpublique and
the Procureur G6n6ral.
The Code expressly places the power of initiating prosecution
in the hands of the Procureur de la Rdpublique. He is charged
with the ascertainment and prosecution of all offenses within the
jurisdiction of the tribunaux correctionnels or the cours d'assises.2 8
Neither the Minister of Justice nor the Procureur G6n~ral has the
power of initiating prosecutions. Where a Procureur de la R~publique refuses to prosecute in any case, their only recourse is to
remove him and substitute a more pliant official. Nor can the
Minister of Justice or the Procureur G~n~ral stop a prosecution
once it has been properly begun. Even though it were started
contrary to the expressed orders of a superior the prosecution can
be ended only by decision of the competent court.
Though the Procureur de la R6publique is expected to obey orders received and may suffer disciplinary measures for disobedience,
he is within his rights if at the trial of a case he presents his own
opinions, according to his reason and his conscience, as to the results
of acts he has done as a representative of the executive power. He is
thus not a servile functionary of the government. Although he is removable at will while a judge has a position for life, a prosecutor is
still a magistrate. He must have the same qualifications, take the
same examinations, serve the same kind of apprenticeship as a trial
judge; he is so much a magistrate that promotion may carry him to a
judicial post instead of to another post in the prosecution hierarchy,
or he may have come to his post as prosecutor from a post in the
judiciary. The French way of expressing the double responsibility
of a prosecutor, to his superiors and to his conscience as a magis24
trate, is the saying: "La plume est serve mais la parole est libre.
Prohibiting a superior from exercising the powers of a subordinate and giving the prosecutor the right to express his own
opinion in court, is an attempt to conciliate the necessity of a
unified direction with independent judgment in the exercise of the
22 Art. 144, C. I. C. If there is no Commissaire of police in the town, or if
the Commissaire is prevented from performing these functions, his place may
be taken by a commissaire stationed in a different town, the assistant (suppleant) to the juge de paix, by the maire, or assistant to the maire (adjoint).
23 Arts. 22, 274, C. I. C.
24 Goyet, op. cit., p. 12.
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power of prosecution. If a Minister of Justice could at any moment
interfere in a criminal prosecution and quash it once it is started,
he would have the power of putting certain classes of individuals
above the laws and of oppressing others. If a prosecutor had to
express the opinion commanded by his superior he would belie his
position as a magistrate. The fact that a Procureur G~n6ral or a
Minister of Justice must adopt the roundabout method of removal
and replacement by another official if a 'prosecutor refuses to perform acts which they want done, prevents a too frequent and too
easy interference with the official to whom the duties of the initiation of prosecution are assigned.
The French organization of prosecution has been a model for
both Germany 25 and Italy.2 6 The prosecuting authorities in Germany and Italy, as in France, are under the unified control of the
Minister of Justice. The organization of prosecution is hierarchical
and parallels that of the courts. A shift in careers is possible. The
27
organization of prosecution in the inferior courts is rudimentary.
In one important respect German and Italian organization differs from the French. The chief prosecuting officer in the former
countries can always substitute himself for the subordinate prosecutor and can at any time take over the duties of his office.2 8 There
is also in Germany a greater degree of subordination of the prosecutors in the lower ranks of the hierarchy to their superiors than
is the case in France. Orders which are given must be obeyed,
29
even to the expression of opinion at the trial.
No prosecuting officer in America has the supervisory powers
comparable to those of the Procureur G6n6ral in France. The
locally elected district attorney runs his office as he pleases. If he
is lax or inefficient, if he is disposed to play politics with his office,
the only real check upon him is his political accountability to the
electorate. But this is a poor substitute for routine sup'ervision.
What impresses the public is what the prosecutor has done in the
25 For the German organization see Arts. 141-147, G. V. G., and E. Friedersdorff, Einfiihrung in die Staatsanwaltschaftliche Praxis, pp. 6-11.
26 For the Italian organization see Arts. 77-96, R. D., 30 dicembre, n. 2786 and
Manzini, Trattatto di Diritto Processuale Penale, Vol. H, p. 261, et seq.
27 The law of Jan. 4, 1924, which gave a large criminal jurisdiction to the
inferior courts (Amtsgerichte) in Germany has somewhat blurred the lines of
the German organization of prosecution. The prosecutor who handles petty offenses (Amtsanwalt) and the prosecutor who is in charge of the pr6secution of
all the more serious offenses, may now both appear in the inferior courts.
2sFor Germany see Arts. 145 and 146(1), G. V. G.; L6we-Rosenberg, Die
Strafprozessordnung fOr das Deutsche Reich, pp. 1193-94; for Italy see Manzini,
op. cit., Vol. I1, p. 272.
29 See Gerland, op. cit., pp. 110-111.

316

MORRIS PLOSCOWE

sensational or striking cases; it is usually ignorant of his handling
of the great mass of ordinary offenses upon which the efficiency of
his office really depends.
On the continent the chief agent of supervision, the Procureur
Gdn6ral, has many different means of exercising control over the
every day functioning of the local prosecuting attorney's office.
The Procureur G~n6ral receives reports which provide information as to the kind of cases handled by the local prosecutor, the
action taken and the reasons. The Procureur G~n6ral moreover,
may at any time demand information and may inspect the dossiers
of any cases in which he is particularly interested. The Procureurs
also make periodic visits of inspection to the offices of their subordinates. It is possible through these means for the Procureur
G6n6ral to know what is taking place in the various prosecuting
offices in his jurisdiction. An energetic Procureur G6n6ral can
keep his subordinates up to a high standard of efficiency in the
enforcement of the criminal law. Since the Ministry of Justice is in
direct contact with the Procureurs G6n6raux, it is possible for it to
maintain high standards of efficiency in prosecution throughout the
country.
The strong administrative supervision over local prosecutors
makes unlikely any such abuse of the prosecutor's office as is encountered in America. The ordinary run of criminal, the burglar,
pick-pocket, hold-up man, etc., could hardly buy immunity from
prosecution. It is usually beyond their means. There are no
sumptuary laws to create golden opportunities for illicit activity.
Professional criminals in Europe do not reap the large gains which
fall to their more fortunate American brothers, and lack the large
sums of money available to corrupt the machinery of law enforcement. The system of administrative supervision makes immunity
an expensive commodity, since not only the local prosecutor has
to be reached but also his superior. Furthermore, prosecutors are
frequently shifted and the protection bought could not be had for
a long period. The traditions of honesty in the magistracy also
make this type of corruption unlikely. Europeans do not accuse
their judges and prosecutors of venality. Despite miserable salaries, high standards of integrity are maintained, so far as the taking of money is concerned.
Obviously, on the other hand, the unified and strong administrative control creates the possibility for those in control to
manipulate the machinery of criminal justice for personal and
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party ends. Two features of the organization enhance this danger.
The Minister of Justice, the directing and active head of the judicial
and prosecution hierarchies, is a politician, not a career official.
He owes his position to political ties and friendships. On this
politician, judges and prosecutors are dependent for advancement.
The magistracy is a career on the continent. The various gradations in the hierarchies of judges and prosecutors are so many
prizes to be attained. They are distributed, by promotion, by the
Minister of Justice. Although bound by certain rules, he still has
the power to retard a man's career or advance him more rapidly
than he deserves. It is well-recognized in Europe that the promotion system makes judges and prosecutors as a class subservient to
the group in power.
Thus individuals who are well connected politically and socially, and who have had the foresight to enlist prominent politicians
in their ventures, have not encountered very much difficulty in
obtaining protection, for their illicit activity in Europe. 3c If the
Minister of Justice can be reached, ether directly or through his
political friends, the inactivity of prosecutors may usually be
achieved through orders from the Minister. The Stavisky case is
an outstanding example of this type of interference in the administration of justice. This possibility of interference in the prosecutions of individuals with some degree of political influence is so well
recognized in France that every time a prosecution may involve
some political personage or some political interest, the prosecutors
must consult the Minister of Justice as to their course of action.
He is the master of what is to be done in this type of case. 1
The use of the criminal law as an instrument to destroy opponents of the political group in power, is also a familiar evil in
Europe. The Reichstag fire trial is but a recent and striking example of this type of political manipulation of justice. Less flagrant
instances were known in Pre-Hitler Germany, 32 in France33 and in
Italy."
Political interference from the top has led many European
writers to demand that the prosecutor be made independent of the
3o See R. De La Grasserie, De la Justice en France et a l'Etranger, Vol. HI,
p. 1093, et seq.
3' H. Chardon, op. cit., p. 416.

32 See remarks of E. Schiffer, Die Deutsche Justiz, pp. 11, 21-22; M. Behradt,
Der Deutsche Richter, pp. 214-217.
3 See remarks of Jeanvrot, De l'Inadmovabilit6 de la Magistrature, p. 196,
et seq; Morizot-Thibault, op. cit., pp. 26-31.
34 See brochure of Saverio Merlino, Politica e Magistratura.
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Minister of Justice.3
To do so, it would be necessary to give him
guarantees against dismissal except for specific cause similar to
those given the judges. It would also be necessary to reform the
promotion system, taking away the right of promotion from the
Minister of Justice. There is little likelihood that these reforms
will be adopted. Control of the prosecution machinery is too valuable a privilege for any government to throw away lightly. If
prosecutors were made independent, Europe would face the problem
of how to maintain the strict supervision which now proves an
obstacle to local deals between prosecutor, criminal and politician.
France, however, has recognized the necessity of giving the
members of the prosecuting hierarchy greater guarantees in the
exercise of their functions. A decree issued last June (1934) provides that a prosecutor may not be dismissed, demoted, or transferred as a disciplinary measure unless the charges are first passed
on by a newly created commission. The commission consists of the
Procureur G6n6ral A la Cour de Cassation, who is its chairman,
two of the oldest judges of the Cour de Cassation, a Director of the
Ministry of Justice, and three prosecutors named by the Minister
of Justice. This Commission may make an investigation of the
charges against the prosecutor and may also examine him personally. The decision of the Commission is only advisory. It does not
bind the Minister of Justice. He retains full freedom of action.But flagrant dismissals or other disciplinary action against prosecutors may be prevented by these provisions. The opinion of the
judiciary and the prosecution hierarchy may be mobilized in support of a decision of the Commission. It would not be politicallya
wise for a Minister of Justice completely to disregard a decision
which may have behind it the full weight of the French "magistrature."
The investigating magistrate is as thoroughly integrated in the
administrative organization as is the trial judge and the prosecutor.
At least one judge is attached to every court of general jurisdiction
in France, Germany and Italy to perform the duties of an investigating magistrate (juge d'instruction, guidice istruttore, Untersuchungsrichter).
In the larger centers several judges are so
designated. In Paris, there are at least forty.
35Morizot-Thibault, op. cit., p. 13; H. Saussier, Le Minist'ere Pu-blic. et le
Pouvoir Central, pp. 55, et seq; Dr. Lobe, in the Verhandlungen des 35 Deutschen
Juristentages, Vol. I, p. 576, et seq. For an opposing view see Dr. Hoepler, in
the Verhandlungen, p. 605, and T. Tinsch, Die Staatsanwaltschaft in der Deutschen
Reichsprozessordnung.
36 Decree of June 5, 1934, in Les Lois Nouvelles, p. 497, et seq.
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In every country the investigating magistrate is appointed to
his post by the Minister of Justice, on the recommendation of the
prosecuting authority, from among the judges attached to the court.
As a judge he has a position for life, but his position as an investigating magistrate is temporary. He is appointed in France for three
years, 37 in Italy,38 and in Germany39 for one year. He may be dismissed from his position as a juge d'instruction by the Minister
of Justice at any time; in such a case he returns to his previous
status as a trial judge.
The investigating magistrate has a dual function. He is an active investigator in a criminal case with large powers for getting at
the truth. At the same time he is a judge called upon to make judicial decisions in the case he is investigating. In France, this dual
character subjects him to a double control. As an investigator, he is
made an officer in the police judiciaire, the group. of police officials
charged with the investigation of criminal cases. The chief officer
of the police judiciaire is the Procureur G6n6ral. With respect to
these functions, therefore, the juge d'instruction is subjected to the
supervision of the prosecuting authority. 40 The Procureur G6n6ral
may take possession of the dossier at any time and thus inform
himself of what the juge d'instruction is doing. He may also order
the juge d'instruction to do specific acts of investigation. The
Procureur G6n6ral may admonish the juge d'instruction if he refuses to obey orders, and may ultimately secure his removal from
his post as juge d'instruction. The recommendation of the Procureur G6n6ral is also a factor in the advancement of the juge
d'instruction. Another control which the prosecutor has over the
juge d'instruction in France, is that in any court where there
are numerous judges d'instruction, it is the prosecutor who distributes the cases among them.4" Besides the supervision of the
prosecuting authority, the juge d'instruction, like any other judge,
is also submitted to the administrative supervision of the president
of the tribunal to which he is attached and on whom he is dependent for recommendation for advancement in the judicial hierarchy.
In theory the juge d'instruction is independent of the prose37
38
39
40
41

Art. 55, C. I. C.

Art. 32, R. D., 30 Dec., n. 2786.
Art. 61, G. V. G.
Art. 279, C. I. C.
For France, see Garraud, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 550-551; For Italy see 296(1),
C. P. P.
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cuting authority. Being a judge and not a prosecutor, the juge
d'instruction is expected to bring to his investigation of criminal
cases that spirit of impartiality which may be expected in judges.
But the actual position made for the juge d'instruction seems to
belie both his impartiality and his independence. It is difficult to
see what formal guarantees of impartiality and independence in the
juge d'instruction may be had where the prosecuting authority in
effect names the juge d'instruction; where the juge d'instruction
is the subordinate of the Procureur G~ndral with respect to part of
his functions; and where, if there are several juges d'instruction the
choice in any particular case is made by the Procureur. Garraud
sums up the situation with the remarks, "One understands in what
limited measure the independence of the juge d'instruction is guaranteed with respect to the government and how true it is to say
that the choice and direction of this magistrate belongs in reality
to the executive power.""'
However, inferences from these conditions must not be overdrawn. Independence is largely a matter of character and the
French laws do make it possible for a juge d'instruction to be independent. The law has provided that in no case is he compelled
to follow the opinions of the Procureur de la R6publique or the
Procureur G6n6ral. He is free to do whatever is necessary in
carrying out his investigations according to his own conscience and
honor as a magistrate. 3 Any independence that the juge d'instruction does show with respect to the prosecuting authorities unquestionably finds support in the rest of the judicial hierarchy. Moreover, independence is not ruinous. At the most the juge d'instruction may lose his functions as investigating magistrate. But he does
not lose his livelihood. He resumes his position and career as a
trial judge.
The independence of the juge d'instruction from the prosecuting
authorities is enhanced, moreover, by a new French decree. Appointments to this position are no longer completely in the hands
of the Minister of Justice. The Minister must make his choice from
three names proposed to him by the newly instituted promotional
commission of five judges. 44 The judiciary has therefore a de42Garraud, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 549. See also discussion by Dormedieu de
Vabres, La Justice Penale d'aujourd'hui, and Guillot, Les Principes du Nouveau
Code d'Instruction Criminelle, pp. 34-35.
43 Garraud, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 33-35.

44The Commission is composed of the Chief Justice and two other judges
of the Cour de Cassation, and two judges of inferior rank.
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cisive influence in the selection of juges d'instruction. It must be
pointed out, however, that the Minister of Justice still has full
powers of revocation. 45
In Germany, although the arrangements are somewhat different
the investigating magistrate (Untersuchungsrichter) is no more independent of the prosecuting authorities than in France. There,
too, the magistrates are appointed by the Minister of Justice for one
year and may be dismissed from these functions at any time. Germany has avoided two mistakes of the French organization. In the
first place, the distribution of the dossiers among various magistrates
is removed from the hands of the prosecutor and vested in the President of the court. Thus the prosecutor cannot pick investigating
magistrates whom he knows to be amenable to conduct particular
investigations in which he may wish to dictate the result.- Secondly,
the investigating magistrate is not a member of the police judiciaire,
and thus the prosecutor has no formal supervision over his acts of
investigation. The investigating magistrate is submitted only to
judicial supervision. But the Germans have made him very much
dependent upon the prosecutor as to when he can begin his investigation and have very rigidly limited him in the extent of his
investigations."
In Italy, appointment of the investigating magistrate is made as
in France and Germany. The Fascist Code provides that the chief
prosecutor (Procuratore Generale) has the right to see that his
investigations are expeditiously performed and that the forms fixed
by law are observed. 47 This provision has been declared by its
proponents to provide purely formal supervision.m " But the opinion
has been expressed that it will increase the factual dependence of
the investigating magistrate upon the prosecuting authority.
Both the prosecutor and the investigating magistrate require the
help of officials and agents in all parts of their jurisdictions to bring
the commission of offenses to their attention and assist them in making their investigations. In France this need has been met by designating certain administrative and police officers as agents of an
institution known as the police judiciaire and making the Procureur
de la R~publique and the juge d'instruction its superior officers in
every jurisdiction. Germany and Italy have adopted this French
45Decret, 20 Feb., 1934, in Les Lois Nouvelles, 1934, p. 246.
46Arts. 179, 155, St. P. 0. See Graf zu Dohna, Das Strafprozessrecht, pp.
145-6.
47 Art. 298, C. P. P.
4s Lavori Preparatori, Vol. VIII, p. 57 et seq.
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conception, but in these countries the investigating magistrate is not
formally named as an officer, though the agents of the police judiciaire are required to carry out his orders.
In France many different functionaries are named as agents of
the police judiciaire and hence subordinates of the juge d'instruction and the Procureur de la R6publique. 9 Some of them, such
as the gardes champttres (rural guards), the gardes foresti~rs
(forest guards)5 0 and the special police of the various governmental departments5 1 have a limited competence. Others, like the
mayors (maires) of the communes and the justices of the peace
(juges de paix) have a more extensive jurisdiction. But. they intervene rarely in criminal prosecutions.5 2 The officials upon whom
the Procureurs and the juges d'instruction place most of their reliance for assistance are (1) the Commissaires of Police, (2) the
Brigades Mobiles, and (3) the Gendarmerie.
The police of most French cities and towns is municipal in
character under the control of an elective mayor (maike) who is in
turn responsible to the prefect of the departement, an administrative official named by and responsible to the central government.
The police of the larger cities (Paris, Marseilles, Lyon, Toulon-etla-Seyne, Nice, Mulhousen, Metz, Strasbourg) are directly under
national control. But even where the police is municipal, its
officers, the commissaires, are agents of the central government.
They are appointed by the Minister of the Interior and are responsible to the Prefect who is a subordinate of the same Minister.
The law provides that there must be at least one commissaire of
police for every 5,000 inhabitants. In the larger cities, there is a
commissaire in every section of the city, working under the direction of a chief commissioner for the whole city.
Besides his duties in connection with the preservation of order,
the commissaire has important functions in connection wth "police
judiciaire." In practice he is the first to be notified when an offense
49 See Art. 9, C. I. C.
50 The garde champetre is charged with the ascertainment of "contraventions"
and rural "ddlits" and certain special offenses such as public drunkenness, traffic
offenses, etc. The garde forestier is charged with the surveillance of forests and
has capacity to determine all "d~lits" and "contraventions" committed therein.
See Goyet, op. cit., pp. 198-199; See also Art. 16, C. I. C.
51 See Le Poittevin, Code d'Instruction Criminelle, Vol. I, p. 157, sec. 3, for
the duties of the agents of the various governmental departments in connection
with "police judiciaire."

52See, as to the assistance of the maires in the work of justice, the remarks
of Henri Chardon, op. cit., pp. 190-191; as to the judges de paix, Garraud, op. cit.,
Vol. II, pp. 590-591.
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is committed in his district. If an arrest has been made he is usually the first to interrogate the accused and decide provisionally
what shall be done with him. The commissaire receives the complaint of the injured party and the declarations of those who have
discovered the offense. He gives notice of the offense to the parquet, makes the summary investigations and arrests when his suspicions are fixed. When the offense is not serious, it is usually
cleared up by these summary investigations. In serious cases, the
activities of the commissaire are preliminary to the main investigation conducted by other officials. Frequently the commissaire, on
the request of the Procureur de la R~publique, makes a summary
investigation (enqu~te officieuse) of a complaint which the Procureur has received, or provides him with information concerning
a particular accused. 3 Despite these important functions, the
criticism is made that "the service of police judiciaire in the smaller
French cities is lractically non-existent."' 4 The commissaire has
almost no means of action. His personnel is limited to a few guards
and secretaries, badly paid and poorly recruited. Criminal investigation of any difficulty is usually beyond his means.5:
In the larger cities and especially in those in which the police
is under national control, the situation is very much better. The
high police officers can call upon definite organizations within their
own departments for purposes of criminal investigation. In Paris,
for example, over 800 agents under the direction of a Directeur de
la Police Judiciaire perform this function and are assisted by a well
organized service of criminal identification and of scientific criminal
investigation.
The insufficiency of the municipal police forces and the gendarmerie to perform the functions of police judiciaire brought into
being in 1908 the brigades mobiles, the second group of officials on
whom procureurs and juges d'instruction must rely. The brigades
mobiles are a national detective force. The country is divided into
17 sections, each with a brigade assigned to it. These brigades are
under the direction and control of the Department of Public Safety
(Suret6 G6n6rale) whose chief is directly responsible to the Minister of the Interior. The Suret6 G6n6rale maintains a very important headquarters service of identification to aid its field agents.
The prosecutor is not in direct contact with the individual agent
53 E. Guyon, L'Organization de ]a Police en France, pp. 39-40.

54 Guyon, ibid, p. 228.
55 See E. Locard, La Police, p. 15.
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of the brigade mobile. Whenever a Procureur de la R6publique or
a juge d'instruction desires the assistance of a member of these
brigades he must send a request to the Procureur G6n6al who will
in turn communicate with the head of the brigade in his jurisdiction. Only in case of urgency may the procureur communicate
directly with the head of the Brigade. By this means control of
the individual agents is left to the head of the force.
The Procureurs and investigating magistrates have made increasing use of these brigades. In small cities and in country villages the brigades do invaluable work. Locard calls them the best
part of the French police organization."6 They have shown what
it is possible to do with a specialized, well-recruited police.57 In
large cities which have their own detective forces, the brigades
mobiles rarely intervene. Excellent as this force is, it is limited in
numbers and acts only in the most serious offenses.
The third force in which the prosecution and juge d'instruction
rely is the gendarmerie, a military force under the direction of the
Minister of War. It is used as a national police force doing service
particularly in rural districts and small towns. Its essential function is to maintain order and prevent crime. But the gendarmerie
is also charged with assisting the Procureur de la Rdpublique and
the juge d'instruction in their investigations. Although this force
is praised for its integrity and its devotion to duty, it is severely
handicapped in the performance of the functions of criminal investigation. The gendarmerie is a military force. Its personnel
is not technically trained for criminal investigation. It is also
hampered by a burden of miscellaneous duties, thrown upon it by
both the Minister of War and the Minister of the Interior, such as
army recruiting and the carrying of messages, which have nothing
to do with police work. 8
Although the officials of the police judiciaire are under the
supervision of the Procureur Gdn6ral, he has no effective way of
enforcing obedience and maintaining satisfactory standards of cooperation with the prosecuting authorities. He may lodge a conplaint with the superior officer of a negligent official or he may
himself warn the man to do better in the future. The Procureur
may even summon the official before the cour d'appel, but this
court has power only to reprimand the delinquent official and con56 Locard, ibid, p. 12.

Locard, ibid, p. 13.
'sSee observations of Guyon, op. cit., p. 169, et seq.
57
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demn him to pay the expenses of the proceeding."9 The agents of
the police judiciaire are therefore as Faustin-Helie points out, almost completely independent of the authority which cannot live
without their cooperation.8
It is possible, however, to avoid serious differences between the
police and the prosecuting authorities in France. The superiors of
the police and of the prosecuting authorities, the Minister of the
Interior and the Minister of Justice, respectively, are in the same
cabinet, which must preserve a unified political front, if it is to
survive. Moreover, there is a realization in France that police and
prosecutors are engaged in one job in which they must work together harmoniously if they wish to see criminals brought to justice.
The respect for a superior which permeates the whole French bureaucracy makes it possible for the Procureur to exercise an authority over his agents even though his position is buttressed by no real
disciplinary powers. Another incentive to cooperation with the
Procureur lies in the fact that he gives his opinion at the end of the
year on the calibre of the individual agent, an opinion which to
some extent determines the advancement of the agent in rank and
remuneration.
Both the Germans and the Italians follow the French plan of
designating certain classes of administrative and police officers as
officials of the police judiciaire subordinate to the prosecuting atTheir organization is subject to difficulties similar to
torney.6
those encountered in France. Only the small German state of
Baden has created a police judiciaire envisaged by the codes of all
three countries. Baden has put its police judiciaire (Kriminal"2
polizei) under the direct control of the prosecuting attorney, leaving .only the uniformed force responsible to the regular police

authority.
The Baden solution for the problem of obtaining cooperation
between police and prosecutor has been suggested-in other countries. 63 But the difficulty is that separation of the detective force
from the rest of the police is not practical. Both the patrol and the
detective force must be in intimate contact with each other; the work
Arts. 279-281, C. I. C.
Faustin-Hlie, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 45.
61 For Germany see Art. 152, G. V. G., and comment thereon in Lfwe-Rosenberg, op. cit., p. 1199, et seq. For Italy see Arts. 219, 220, 221, C. P. P.
62 Schlanbush, Staatsanwaltschaft und Kriminalpolizei, Zeitschrift fUr die
gesamte Strafrechtwissenchaft, Vol. 52 (1932) pp. 621-632, at pp. 623-624.
63 See remarks of Casabianca, Revue Penitentiaire, Vol. 44 (1920) p. 30. Compare, E. Locard, op. cit., pp. 27-30.
59
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of one supplements that of the other, and they are vitally interdependent in the performance of their functions. Recognizing the
inadvisability of dividing the police, some reformers suggest that
the whole police be turned over to the prosecuting authorities. 4
Others, recognizing the factual predominance of the police in the
preliminary procedure, make the opposite suggestion, that the prosecution hierarchy be incorporated in the police. 5 This proposal has
received severe criticism. It was pointed out that judicial authorities are not the instruments of the police, that the prosecuting attorney when he represents the accusation is acting as a servant of
the court and in a judicial capacity. He cannot be an agent of the
police at the same time.6
Finally, many who recognize the shortcomings of the present
organization believe that the separation of the police from prosecutors is essentially sound.These reformers suggest that steps
should be taken to bring the prosecuting authorities into personal
touch with the individual agents who make the actual investigations.
It is recommended that the prosecuting attorney be trained in criminal investigations so that he would be better able to direct the
operations of the investigators in the individual case. By keeping
the prosecuting attorney independent while providing for greater
cooperation, these writers hope to obtain the benefit of critical,
unbiased legal advice from the one whose job it is to represent the
accusation at the trial.
Although the problem of securing efficient cooperation between
prosecuting authorities and police has not received an altogether
satisfactory solution in European countries, they have at least set
up a conception of a group of police officials specially designated by
law to assist the prosecuting attorney in the exercise of his functions. In America also, it is understood that prosecutors must have
police cooperation. But we have no such conception as in Europe
of a police judiciaire to assist the prosecuting attorney in the exercise of his functions. The police are usually subject to the mayor
64 See comment of Dr. Lobe in Verhandlungen des 35 Deutsche Juristentag,
Vol. II, pp. 572-573. Compare Chardon, op. cit., pp. 206-208.
65 See G. Crusen, Staatsanwaltschaft und Kriminalpolizei, Deutsche RichterZeitung, Vol. 24, 1932, pp. 16-18.
66 See for example, D. Chrzescinski, Gegenwart und Zukunft der Staatsanwaltschaft 32 Deutsche Juristenzeitung (1927) pp. 1294-1299; Dr. Schmidt, Deutsche
Richterzeitung, Vol. 23, 1931, pp. 363-365.
6(7Dr. May, Staatsanwaltschaft und Kriminalpolizei, Vol. 52, Zeitschrift fUr
die Gesamte Strafrechtwissenschaft (1932) pp. 612-621. Schlanbusch, loc. cit.,
Dr. A. Bohme, Neue Wege des Kriminalpolizei, Archiv fUr Kriminologie, Vol. 89,
(1931) pp. 129-138.
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and the prosecuting attorney, though a state official, is locally elected.
If the mayor and the prosecuting attorney are of the same political
party, cooperation may be expected. But even this is not altogether
certain. In Chicago, for example, when States Attorney Crowe and
Mayor Thompson quarrelled, though they belonged to the same
political party, one of the first things that Mayor Thompson did
was to withdraw from Crowe's office the members of the police who
had been detailed to assist him, and Crowe was compelled to hire
private detectives to carry on his duties. Such a situation is inconceivable in Europe. Although the prosecuting attorney is subject
to the Minister of Justice and the police to the Minister of Interior,
the two Ministers are members of the same cabinet. If their departments did not cooperate, their cabinet could hardly stand
politically.

